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Today multinational firms face grave uncertainties with respect to 
their investment strategies in other countries. This paper stresses the 
importance of integrating the descriptive aspects of this problem with 
prescriptive recommendations. It does so by raising two interrelated 
questions: 
(1) How do multinational firms and insurers deal with the problems 
of international risk in making their decisions on what invest- 
ments to undertake? 
(2) What role can analytic approaches, including insurance mechan- 
isms, play in better managing risk and uncertainty in interna- 
tional transactions? 
These questions are addressed by developing a conceptual frame- 
work which emphasizes the importance of problem formulation, institu- 
tional arrangements and decision processes as a basis for prescriptive 
recommendations. The problem is characterized by lack of a detailed 
statistic a1 data base to estimate probabilities and consequences of dif- 
ferent types of political, economic, and social risks. Corporate planners 
and risk managers who have responsibihty for these investment decisions 
would Like concreteness. Hence, their actions appear to be greatly influ- 
enced by past experience and personal contacts. 
Our prescriptive recommendations are designed to widen the statist- 
ical data base by the use of experts and Bayesian analysis as well as to 
broaden the responsibility for investment decisions within the organiza- 
tion. We also propose a jointly operated US private-federal insurance pro- 
gram which maintains features of current government operated systems 
but has private firms marketing policies and settling claims. 
The above theoretical concepts are illustrated with a case study of 
Indonesia's investment evaluation problem pursuant to their decision to 
provide the United States with liquefied natural gas in the early 1970's. 
This case study illustrates the political risks of firms investing even in 
highly developed economies such as the United States. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Multinational firms face grave uncertainties today with respect to 
their investment strategies which involve other countries. In particular, 
there has been an increasing awareness by international managers of the 
difficulty of predicting the future political and economic climate which is 
likely to exist in a foreign country. One only has to look at the following 
headlines from The Economist during the first few months of 1981 to see 
graphically the types of uncertainties which exist in different parts of the 
world: 
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Iran and Iraq: A New Front in a Slow War? (January 3, 1981) 
El Salvador: Final Offensive to the Next? (January 17, 1981) 
Ecuador and Peru: The Oil War (February 7, 1981) 
Poland: A Shaky Kind of Peace (March 21, 1981) 
Arab-Israel Conflict: Steam from the Middle East's Back 
Burner (March 28, 1981) 
The above illustrative examples on the unstable world situation cou- 
pled with the continuing interest by multinational firms in investing 
abroad have motivated two broad questions which this paper addresses: 
(1) How do multinational firms and insurers deal with the problems 
of international risk in making their decisions on what invest- 
ments to undertake in foreign countries? 
(2) What role can analytic approaches, including insurance mechan- 
isms, play in better managing risk and uncertainty in interna- 
tional transactions? 
The first question is of a descriptive nature, while the second one has 
a prescriptive flavor. A basic theme of this paper is the importance of 
undertaking descriptive analysis before making prescriptive recommen- 
dations. In the next section we develop a conceptual framework which 
highlights the importance of integrating these two components of the 
analysis. Sections 111 and TV probe into the actual decision processes util- 
ized by investors and insurers in coping with international risk (Question 
1). The concluding section addresses ways to improve the process 
through prescriptive analysis (Question 2). 
In order to make the analysis more concrete we will illustrate the 
theoretical concepts with an actual problem facing Indonesia: whether to 
invest in facilities which will provide the United States with liquefied 
natural gas. This case illustrates that companies planning to invest in 
projects which rely on actions by the United States may face similar 
types of political and economic risks as do American-based firms contem- 
plating projects in less-developed areas of the world. 
The problems we will be focusing on in this paper are associated with 
insurance decisions of multinational firms undertaken to protect their 
foreign investments against so-called "country risks." In order to discuss 
this problem in a real world context, there is a need to understand the 
nature of country risk, the relevant institutional arrangements and the 
decision processes of the interested parties. These three elements form 
the descriptive component of the conceptual framework. Prescriptive 
analysis can then be undertaken with a clearer understanding of the 
relevant information and constraints facing multinational firms and insur- 
ers. Figure 1 depicts these four elements of the conceptual framework, 
each of whch will now be described in turn. 
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Figure 1. Elements of Conceptual Framework 
NATURE OF COUNTRY RISK 
. 
Raymond Vernon (1971), in his classic study Swmeignty at  Bay 
described the remarkable development of multinational enterprises and 
their potential conflicts with national governments. Ten years later in a 
retrospective view of his book, Vernon (1981) pointed out that the central 
question facing multinational firms is "How do the sovereign states pro- 
t 
INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
W Host Country 
Investors 
R Insurers 
DECISION PROCESS 
4 * E Estimation of Probability and Losses E Allocation of Responsility 
Avoidance of Uncertainty 
pose to deal with the fact that so many of their enterprises are conduits 
through which other sovereigns exert their inl'luence?" This question 
implies that any multinational firm must seriously consider the possible 
reactions that countries will have to their investments. Insurers must 
similarly focus on the probability of specific losses and the likely conse- 
quences to the investor firms. Other papers by Dun.,  Shubik, and Ver- 
non, in this volume, discuss the nature of these country risks facing firms 
and insurers so we will only briefly allude to them here. There are several 
categories of country risk which need to be considered. 
PoLitical Element 
Risks under this heading are connected with actions taken by a coun- 
try in response to political and social developments. Some of the possible 
developments which are likely to have adverse consequences on specific 
investments are: 
incovertability of currency 
repudiation, default or rescheduling of loans 
expropriation of facilities 
war, revolution or insurrection 
sabotage of facilities 
The social climate within the country must also be taken into 
account by firms who require formal approval for their proposed invest- 
ment a t  the local, municipal, and state governmental level. One only has 
to witness the changing history of nuclear power to recognize that what 
appeared to be an investment which would be tacitly approved by the 
public in the 1950s and 1960s has been viewed very differently in recent 
years (Hohenemser et al. 1977). 
Economic Risk 
Here one has to distinguish between external and internal risks. By 
e z t e r n d  risks we are referring to the adverse effects caused by events 
outside of the control of the host country. For example, one must con- 
sider the likelihood and consequences of changing prices and uncertain 
future demand for goods which are produced by a proposed project. The 
degree of uncertainty on the returns from an investment will influence 
the final decision on whether or not it should be undertaken. 
Infernal risks refer to direct actions taken by the host country 
which have an impact on the project. For example, the government of a 
country can subsidize an internal producer of a competing product in 
order to threaten the profitability of a foreign investment. Changes in 
labor laws and working conditions can raise production costs so the 
investment is less competitive on world markets. 
Safety and Enu.i~onrnental Risk 
Here we are referring to direct losses to the investment itself and 
the indirect consequences to others. Natural disasters, such as floods, 
earthquakes, or fire, can cause severe damage to a facility or plant. 
There can also be man-made disasters such as explosions which can darn- 
age the facility and may also kill or severely injure employees or individu- 
als residing nearby. A set of other harmful effects such as pollution, 
noise, environmental degradation may also be created by a particular 
project. Both the investing firm and potential insurers will want to know 
the extent of their liability from any of these negative impacts. 
Figure 1 identilies the four interested parties who are involved in the 
decision process with respect to the problem of managing international 
risk. 
Host Country 
We assume there is an expressed interest in having funds invested in 
a particular country. In many cases the host country will not be able to 
give credible assurances that such an investment, if approved, will be 
immune to the effects of political risks. 
Investor 
Multinational firms often can invest in a number of different projects, 
each of which will be viewed differently by them. Funds can be allocated 
for modernization or expansion of an existing enterprise in a host coun- 
try, for a new facility, or for exploration of natural resources (e.g., gas, 
oil, minerals). The project can be jointly owned by the investor and a firm 
in the host country or it can be controlled entirely by the investing firm. 
With respect to the organizational structure, corporate investment 
planners have the responsibility for collecting data and judging the rela- 
tive attractiveness of specific projects. They are frequently assisted by 
outside experts who have specialized knowledge of the host countries 
(Rummel and Heenan 1978). 
Today governmental and private insurers provide various forms of 
political risk insurance. Within the private sector Lloyd's has written pro- 
tection against w a r  damage to sea shipments since the early 1800's but 
only within the last ten years have they begun to write insurance against 
other political risks. In 1978 the private market was broadened when the 
American International Group began offering different types of political 
risk coverage (Ralston 1981). In addition, other large companies such as 
the Insurance Company of North America (INA), have recently also offered 
coverage against selected political risks. 3 
Another form of insurance coverage is through the Federal Credit 
Insurance Association (FCIA) which represents approximately 50 private 
insurance companies and has the backing of the Export-Import Bank. 
This insurance is available only for goods and services exported from the 
US. At  the governmental level the Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion (OPIC) was formed in 1969 to encourage U S  companies. to  invest in 
less-developed countries by offering insurance against political hazards 
such as expropriation and war. Before providing coverage, OPIC must be 
assured through bilateral agreements between the U S  and the host coun- 
try that its rights are recognized (West 1980). 
'INA wrote its first policy in 1792 on a merchant sea captain's life and then went on to insure 
international cargo (Cathey 1981). 
In most other Western countries similar governmental agencies pro- 
vide insurance against expropriation, inconvertibility, war, revolution and 
insurrection.* The Central Banks of other developing countries fre- 
quently provide loan guarantees which enable investors to obtain funds 
from the eurocurrency market in currencies not native to their country. 
qlfected Public 
The local populace may have little say regarding the investment deci- 
sion itsel.! even though they are the ones most directly affected by the 
negative environmental consequences such as noise and pollution. Once 
the project is in place this group may be the primary cause of govern- 
ment actions to expropriate a facility, if the perceived economic returns 
to them are overwhelmed by social and environmental costs. Predicting 
the attitudes and decision processes of the affected public is a difficult 
task given the diversity in cultural and social values within a country and 
between countries. These aspects are discussed in more detail in Dunn 
and Shubik (this volume). 
 or example, in 1971, France set up two systems to protect the foreign investments of their 
companies, one managed by its foreign trade bank BFCE (Banque Francaise pour le Com- 
merce Erteriur) and the other by the COFACE (Compagnie Francaise dlAssurance a 
llExportation) (Chavlier and Hirsch 198 1). 
DECISION PROCESSES 
To explain and predict the responses by multinational firms and 
insurance companies to international hazards requires a closer look at 
their decision processes. By d e c i s i o n  processes we mean the way each of 
these parties structure their perceived alternatives, the data they have 
collected, the evaluation of the alternatives and their final choice. 
Before the investor and insurer can evaluate the relative attractive- 
ness of a particular alternative there needs to be a clear understanding of 
the elements comprising risk. We will utilize the language of decision 
analysis to formulate the problem, although we recognize that in practice 
firms may not undertake such a formal approach. 
Consider a particular project which has been proposed by a host 
country to a multinational firm. In Figure 2 we consider a specific 
Ln 
Figure 2. Events and Consequences of Firm's Investment Decision 
investment, Project A, where there are n possible events, each of whch 
has a certain Likelihood of occurring and an associated outcome. The 
investor assigns probability @' to the occurrence of each event i; C' 
represents the consequence to the project if this event occurs. Some 
events by the host country (e.g., political or economic stability) will yield 
positive profits while others (e.g., social conflict) may produce losses. 
The insurer may have a different representation of the tree but the for- 
mal structure will be the same as shown in Figure 2. 
In practice, constructing a decision tree is difficult for problems 
such as international risk since there is an extremely sparse data base on 
which to specify events or estimate probabilities and consequences of dif- 
ferent outcomes with any statistical precision. It is also difficult for the 
relevant parties to formulate a causal model on which to base a con- 
tingent structure of probabilities and consequences. 
lnvesto~ C t m c m  
The decision process of the key individuals or groups in the multina- 
tional firm specifying investment priorities will be influenced by the insti- 
tutional structure of the organization. Two elements play an important 
role in influencing the collection and processing of data for choosing 
between proposed projects: the allocation of responsibility for the conse- 
quences of decisions and the use of simplified decision rules by organiza- 
tions. 
Allocath of Respatsib.il2y. In their classic study of the behavioral 
theory of the firm, Cyert and March (1963) theorized that each part of the 
organization has a set of independent goals and constraints which guide 
its actions. We hypothesize that this feature of the organizational struc- 
ture plays a key role in the foreign investment decision by many firms. 
Corporate investment planners are held responsible for the outcomes of 
their decisions with respect to particular projects. For this reason they 
try to share responsibility for uncertain outcomes with others and to 
avoid negative outcomes. There is thus a reliance on experts for advice, 
as well a s  a tendency to favor projects in foreign countries where invest- 
ment planners feel they understand the situation very well. 
Simpl i f i ed  Decision Rules .  Organizations prefer to  develop simple 
decision rules which enable them to  avoid collecting information on 
future events (Cyert and March 1963). For this reason investors a re  likely 
to utilize threshold models of choice, whereby projects are  approved only 
if the corporate risk manager perceives the chances of a given event to  
be  below an  acceptable risk level. Acceptable risk levels themselves 
might vary according to  the country, the nature of the  risk, and the  
economic stakes involved. 
If the problem is structured in this way, firms can avoid undertaking 
a detailed analysis of the consequences of different events. If 4: is the 
acceptable risk level for a project of (type) i, then the decision rule 
under a threshold model is simply: accept i if its assessed risk level 
4i 4 4; otherwise reject the project. One can justify this heuristic in 
te rms of the  attention which needs to  be devoted to  each investment 
decision. By specdying a cutoff point for examining specific projects, the  
investment planner is using a simple heuristic for comparing and pooling 
decision outcomes across projects of the same type and for reducing the  
time spent on collecting data and examining alternatives (Borkan and 
Kunreuther 1979). 
I m r m  concerns 
Insurance firms face additional problems of uncertainty which 
revolve around information asymmetries. Specifically the insurer has 
limited information regarding the risk characteristics of firms' invest- 
ment decisions now as well as in the future. This asymmetric information 
between the insurer and the insured creates problems of adverse selec- 
tion and moral hazard. These problems are likely to be greater in the 
international hazard area due to the lack of published information on 
which to base estimates of probabilities and future expected losses from 
a foreign investment. 
Adverse selection. This is caused by the inability of insurance firms to 
fully discriminate among different types of risks in specifying premiums. 
The insurance industry may thus attract a portfolio of investors whose 
risk exposure is worse than average. In order to cover costs, premiums 
would have to be raised above the average costs of all investors facing the 
risk in question, possibly excluding some of the better risks because of 
high premiums. Eventually, rates may be so high that only the poorest 
risks, if any, are willing to insure and the market fails. This spiral effect 
has been discussed widely in the economics and insurance literature (see 
Arrow 1971). For adverse selection to occur, investors must have better 
information on the nature of their risks than private insurance firms. 
Mural H a z a r d .  This refers to the limited ability of the insurer to 
predict changes in the investor's behavior after they are insured. Multi- 
national firms may then be less concerned with a project's success than if  
they had to bear the entire risk themselves. If insurers do not anticipate 
these behavioral shifts, then premiums will be inadequate to cover their 
expected losses. 
Covemtment R e g u l a t i m .  Insurers are very concerned with the role 
of governmental regulations on their operations and on market structure. 
For example, US based insurance firms have become increasingly con- 
cerned over barriers to entry in marketing insurance in other countries. 5 
Such regulations can strongly affect efficiency of risk pooling by 
insurance firms. They also adversely affect the competitive process by 
restricting market entry. 
PRESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
An understanding of the institutional arrangements and decision 
processes of investors and insurers toward country risk provides insights 
on ways of improving the management of risk and uncertainty in interna- 
tional transactions. O u r  interest in this paper will be on two areas of 
prescriptive analysis. In Section V below, we will consider how political 
risk assessment can be improved within the multinational firm itself. In 
the concluding portion of the paper, we consider cooperative institutional 
arrangements between the private insurance industry and the govern- 
ment in providing wider insurance coverage against international risks. 
'personal conversation with John Cox, President of Insurance Company of North America. 
In this section we utilize our conceptual framework to provide more 
detail on the decision processes that multinational firms are likely to util- 
ize in coping with the problems of international risk. We motivate our dis- 
cussion with a real world example: the problem faced by Indonesia as to 
whether they should invest financial resources into constructing facilities 
for shipping liquefied natural gas (LNG) abroad. In particular, we focus on 
the question "Should Indonesia enter into a formal contract with United 
States firms to supply a specific quantity of LNG over the next 20 years?" 
Simplified models of the choice process based on this particular problem 
are constructed, even though we are aware that the actual decision mak- 
ing process is far more complicated than our treatment implies. The 
exercise is thus designed to stimulate ideas as to ways one can describe 
investor behavior in a more realistic manner. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a potential source of energy which 
requires a fairly complicated technological process for transportation 
and storage that has the potential, albeit with low probability, of creating 
severe losses. For purposes of transportation and storage, natural gas is 
liquefied to reduce their volume hundreds of times. It is then shipped in 
specially constructed tankers and received at a terminal where it under- 
goes regasification and is then distributed to different parts of the coun- 
try mostly by pipelines with the remainder carried by trucks or railcars. 
Due to the volatile nature of these liquids, there are potential catas- 
trophic losses associated with explosions of a tanker or from a fire at a 
receiving terminal. Figure 3 depicts the major segments of an LNG pro- 
ject. 
PRODUCING COUNTRY OCEAN TRANSPORTATION IMPORTING COUNTRY 
Liquefaction and Receiving 
Natural Gasfield Related Facilities Tanker Fleet Terminal Facilities 
Production 
Gathering 
Processing 
Gas to  
Distributors 
-
Adopted from Jensen Associates, Inc. 
Figure 3, Major Segments of a Liquefied Natural Gas Project. 
Indonesia became a logical source of gas supply to other countries 
after Mobil Oil Indonesia announced in late 1971 that they had discovered 
large reserves of natural gas in northern Sumatra (i.e., the Arun field). 
The United States then expressed interest in buying Indonesian LNG. In 
1972, the principal decision facing Pertamina, the Indonesia state-owned 
oil company, was whether they wanted to construct a liquefaction and 
loading facility for shpping LNG abroad. 
Although they were not investing money in facilities in other coun- 
tries, Pertamina faced the possibility that the United States would not 
construct a site for receiving the LNG. In this sense, the US plays the role 
of the host country with the associated set of political and social risks 
facing Pertamina re the approval process of the receiving and regasifica- 
tion terminals in ~alifornia.' Since the proposed contract was for 20 
years there were also economic risks associated with the project. Given 
the large investment costs required for constructing the Indonesian facili- 
ties, all of which are borne by Pertamina, there was some concern over 
the stability of future markets for LNG due to the uncertainty of future 
world energy prices. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Each real world problem involving foreign investments has a special 
set of institutional arrangements which reflect the regulatory and politi- 
cal structure of the involved countries. In our specific example the inves- 
tor, Pertamina, could only enter into any contract on shipping LNG 
abroad after it was approved by the Indonesian government. With respect 
to the host country, the United States, two gas utilities in California 
(Pacific Lighting Corporation and Pacific Gas and Electric) formed a 
partnership to import LNG from Indonesia through a subsidiary PacIn- 
donesia. Any contract signed between PacIndonesia and Pertamina was 
subject to approval by the Federal Power Commission. 
Other parties also had a stake in the final decision. For large scale 
investments, such as LNG facilities, a substantial portion of the required 
funds are provided by long-term loans. The lenders, who include banks 
and insurance companies, utilize other people's money and thus are 
'~alifornia was proposed as the state where LNG would be received from Indonesia. 
obliged to repay in full. Hence before undertaking the financing of such 
projects, they will try to obtain some torm of insurance against possible 
losses from the risks listed above. In the case of Indonesia, lenders to 
Pertamina, which included the eurocurrency market, were guaranteed 
repayment of any financial loss by the Indonesia Central Bank (Office o! 
Technology Assessment 1980). Hence the risk from the proposed invest- 
ment was assumed by the government directly rather than by the state- 
owned company. 
DECISION PROCESSES 
Use of DecisimL P e e s  
Let us first turn to the question of how the investor is likely to evalu- 
ate whether to commit funds to a particular project. In the case of Per- 
tamina their decision was undoubtedly influenced by their estimate of the 
probability that California would approve the siting of an LNG terminal. 
Pertamina was entirely at risk with respect to the investment costs of 
their liquefaction and loading facilities.' To keep the analysis simple sup- 
pose that in 1972 Pertamina feels the United States is their only potential 
8 customer of the LNG and that the company estimates the probability of 
California not siting a facility to be = .05. Should this scenario develop 
we assume that the cost of converting the Indonesian facility to other 
uses would involve a net loss of $900 million. If California did construct a 
'A force majeure clause in that contract absolved the United States from any obligation to 
ay for gas should California not site a facility. 
'h reality. Japan also expressed interest in possibly purchasing LNG, although negotiations 
on a contract did not begin until 1073. 
receiving terminal, then Pertamina anticipates that their total 
discounted profit on the investment would be $270 million. The Indone- 
sian firm knows that if it does not invest in liquefaction facilities it could 
invest its resources in government securities wbch are known to yield 
$180 million with certainty. 
The relevant branches and outcomes for the decisions "lnvest in LNG 
facilities" and "Do not Invest in LNG Facilities" are depicted in Figure 4. If 
U.S. Sites Terminal (+27 0) 
Invest in LNG Facility @1 = 0.95 
U.S. Does Not Site Terminal 
1 91 = 0.05 
(-900) 
Do Not Invest in LNG Facility 
Figure 4. Decision Tree for Evaluating Pertamina's Options 
one were using the criterion of maximizing expected or average return on 
investment then the LNG facilities would be deemed attractive.' In real- 
ity the actual situation is much more complicated than the simple tree of 
Figure 4. There are questions with respect to the final terms of the con- 
tract, the future prices of different forms of energy, the costs in con- 
structing the liquefaction and loading facility, and various social and pol- 
itical factors which may affect the probabilities, consequences and causal 
'The expected return for investing in the LNG facilities is simply the sum of probabilities 
times consequences, i.e., Pertamina would prefer to invest rather than not (21 1.5 vs 180). Lf, 
however, Pertamina's management were atrongly risk averse so there was a high disutility 
assigned to  the large loss then the reverse preference might hold. See Raitia (1968) for a 
discussion of how utilities and disutilities can be introduced into this analysis. 
links between events. Each of these uncertainties could be represented 
in a more complicated decision tree and Pertamina would then be faced 
with the difficult task of providing estimates of these additional parame- 
ters. 
As we pointed out in the previous section, the lack of a good statisti- 
cal data base makes it unlikely that Pertamina actually followed this for- 
mal analysis process. We do not know exactly how the company went 
about making its decision but we can suggest factors which may have 
influenced their data collection and processing activities. Our conjec- 
tures are derived from related research on how firms behave with respect 
to country risk (see Vernon this volume) coupled with empirical data on 
individual and organizational behavior toward low probability events. 
Systematic Biases 
Due to the lack of a good statistical data base, past experience with 
the host country is likely to be an important element in determining 
whether to invest in a particular project. Most firms feel they do not have 
a good understanding of the relationship between events and managerial 
contingencies from historical data to estimate the probabilities and 
consequences of future events on particular investments. Kobrin (1981) 
points out that impacts of political risks on firms are rarely documented 
with the exception of expropriation. As a result firms frequently focus on 
recent events to the exclusion of others in making their judgments. 
Undue importance may be placed on dramatic events, such as a student 
riot or a palace coup, which suggest that the country is unstable when, in 
fact, it is not (Rummel and Heenan 1978). Economists who have studied 
corporate risk management feel that too much time is devoted by multi- 
nationals to worrying about these headline-grabbing events and not 
enough attention is given to studying erratic shifts in foreign laws and 
regulations which steadily erode corporate profits (Business Week 1981). 
Kelley (1981) provides empirical evidence on the role of past experi- 
ence in the foreign investment decision m a w  process through a study 
of 105 multinational firms, all in the Fortune 500. She points out that It a 
firm has suffered recent losses from political risks, it tends to use a finer 
screen and undertakes a more detailed and sophisticated analysis of this 
factor before making future decisions. 
This type of biased behavior on the part of firms has been well docu- 
mented in field survey and controlled laboratory experiments. Tversky 
and Kahneman (1 974) have labeled this phenomenon availability, whereby 
one judges the probability of future events by the ease with which one can 
remember past ones. An example of the availability bias from the field of 
financial investment is provided by Guttentag and Herring (1981). They 
indicate that several European banks (e.g., the Fugger Bank, the Bardi, 
and the Peruzzi) became insolvent during the Middle Ages because of 
default on large loans by sovereign borrowers. These rulers had a past 
history of paying back small loans. By focusing only on the number of 
times loans were repaid it appeared as if the sovereign had a favorable 
record when, in fact, he was a very risky customer. 
Nisbett and Ross (1980) provide anecdotal and case history evidence 
which suggest that individuals give more weight to evidence which is vivid, 
i.e., concrete and easily recalled. The authors point out that the 
availability heuristic is a prime determinant of the effect of vividness on 
causal inference, since graphic information is more likely to be remem- 
bered than bland data. 
Empirical studies on consumer decision-making with respect to low 
probability events reveal similar behavior. For example, few individuals 
voluntarily protect themselves against the financial consequences of 
natural hazards until after a disaster occurs. Kunreuther, st d.  (1978) 
have documented the importance of past experience as a critical variable 
in the insurance purchase decision against flood and earthquakes by sta- 
tistically analyzing data from face to face interviews with 3000 homeown- 
ers, half of them insured and the other half uninsured. A comment from 
a homeowner in a flood prone area illustrates the importance of past 
experience in determining his attitude toward future coverage: 
I've talked to the different ones that have been bombed out. 
This was their feelings: the $60 in premiums they could use for 
something else, but now they don't care if the figure was $600. 
They're going to take insurance because they have been through 
it twice and learned a lesson from it. (Kunreuther, e t  al. p.112) 
Similar behavior was observed in earthquake areas of California. Follow- 
ing the Santa Barbara quake of 1978, insurance agents noted that there 
was a sharp increase in demand for coverage (MacDougall 1981). 
The media can play a key role in highhghting certain events which 
then increases their salience as perceived by the public. As a result 
there is often a tendency to estimate the probability of a particular event 
to be much higher than it actually is. Combs and Slovic (1978) undertook 
a study of the frequency with which two newspapers reported various 
causes of death. They found that violent deaths such as homicides, 
accidents, and natural disasters were over-reported, while diseases were 
under-reported. These biases in coverage corresponded closely to biases 
found in a previous study (Lichtenstein, et al. 1978) in which people were 
asked to judge the frequency of these same causes of death. Their find- 
ings suggest that there may be similar biases with respect to political 
risk if firms focus on headlines as a basis for judging the magnitude of the 
risks facing a particular investment. 
Role of R e p e t  
The absence of both a detailed statistical data base and a causal 
model of political and economic risk places an enormous responsibility on 
the shoulders of the corporate investment planner. He is likely to be 
highly sensitive to the potential losses when committing funds to a pro- 
ject. We hypothesize that one of the important factors influencing the 
decision on whether or not to invest in a particular project is how much 
the responsible individual will regret each choice on the basis of possible 
outcomes. Savage (1954) has defined the concept of regret as the 
difference between the level of assets that the decision maker obtains 
when a given event occurs and the best that one cou!d hare done had one 
known that this particular event would actually happen. Bell (1982) has 
used this concept in a similar manner. 
Figure 5 illustrates regret for the simplified problem treated earlier. 
The choice between investing and not investing is characterized by two 
attributes, the first one being the actual consequence Ci, and the second 
one indicating the amount of money that would have been earned had the 
(+270, +180) Invest in LNG Facilities @1 = 0.95 
@2 = 0.05 (-900, + 180) 
(+I 80, +270) 
= 0.95 
Do Not Invest in LNG (+180, -900) 
Facilities @2 = 0.05 
Figure 5. Regret as Part of Pertamina's Decision Tree. 
other action been taken. 
Before recommending that Pertamina invest in LNG facilities the 
planner would compare the outcomes under both branches of the tree 
"Invest in LNG facility," with the return from a certain investment should 
it not "Invest in LNG Facilities" (i.e., +180). If the event represented by 
Q1 occurs, then there is no regret. If the event associated with a2 is real- 
ized, then the planner would be subject to a regret of 1080 (i.e., 900 + 
180). This represents the difference between the actual consequence and 
the best outcome that could have been obtained had the planner known 
in advance that 02 would occur, and hence would have opted not to Invest 
in LNG Facilities. A similar analysis would be undertaken in evaluating 
the regret in the decision "Not to invest in LNG Facilities." 
If regret is an important factor in the decision making process, then 
the investment planner will base hls decision partly on potential returns 
and partly on foregone returns. If the foregone returns are sufficiently 
large and regret is weighed heavily in his process, then the manager may 
prefer not to take the responsibility for having made a " b a d  decision 
even if the probability of this outcome is relatively small. 
Regret can be avoided by partly shifting the responsibility for taking 
actions to others. Hopple and Kuhlman (1981) point out that firms are 
increasingly relying on country and area specialists in making their deci- 
sions. Investment planners can also utilize personal contacts in the host 
country where an investment is planned. These sources of information 
provide firms with a more detailed rationale for justirylng investment 
actions. 
The principal disadvantage of this strategy, when there is no 
insurance, is that it frequently leads to a lack of diversification across 
countries because of large transaction costs associated with finchug 
experts and personal contacts from many different nations. Guttentag 
and Herring (1981) have noted a tendency of some banks to concentrate 
most of their foreign investments in a few countries. This opens them up 
to the possibility of large losses should these governments refuse to 
honor foreign debts. The bank's strategy of not di.versifying their port- 
folio widely may appear to be economically sound given the advantages of 
specialization. On the other hand, the lack of perfect capital markets 
increases their probability of going bankrupt should foreign investments 
be threatened by events such as expropriation or inconvertibility of 
currency. 
T?areshold Models 
An additional way to reduce the possibility of regret is not to under- 
take any actions unless the probability of a failure is below a given thres- 
hold level. To illustrate, suppose Pertamina used a threshold model for 
screening out projects. It would then specify a n  acceptable risk level @ *  
which would be used as a criterion for approving and disapproving a pro- 
ject. If the risk associated with failure a2 was less than @ *  then  the pro- 
ject would be approved, subject to the additional condition that  the 
expected rate of re turn  for success was above an acceptable level. If 
iP2 > i P C ,  then the project would be rejected no matter  how high the rate 
of re turn  would be. L o o w  a t  the data  in Figure 4, the  LNG liquefaction 
and loading facility would be approved if 3' > .05 and 3270 million was 
considered an  acceptable re turn  on the proposed investment. 
In a study of 38 companies considering foreign investments, Aharoni 
(1966) provides empirical evidence on the importance of threshold 
models for initially screening out projects which have a sufficiently h g h  
risk. Kelley (1981) finds similar behavior on the par t  of the  105 firms she 
investigated. Investment planners made decisions on the basis of accept- 
able ra tes  of re turn  and acceptable risk levels. Each situation was looked 
a t  on its own merits without any attempt to undertake any type of port- 
folio o r  covariance analysis across projects, as would be implied by an 
optimization model. This type of decision rule reduced the costs of col- 
lecting and processing large amounts of data and avoided uncertainty. It 
thus conforms to the hypotheses advanced by Cyert and March (1963) in 
their behavioral theory of the firm. 
The use of threshold models to avoid having to focus on the conse- 
quences of extremely low probability events is utilized by consumers and 
government agencies as well as business organizations. In making their 
insurance decisions, an individual frequently concludes that if the proba- 
bility of a flood or earthquake is below some given level a *  then it won't 
happen to me; hence it is not worth worrying about the potential conse- 
quences. In such a case insurance protection is not even considered (Slo- 
vic, et al. 1977; Kunreuther, et  al. 1978). Government regulatory agencies 
such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, use threshold rules on which 
to  evaluate the licensing decision of plants. If they deem the probability 
of a severe accident to be below i ~ '  then they don't worry about the 
consequences and may overlook design features of a plant which could 
produce a very serious accident (Jackson and Kunreuther 1981). 
Taken together, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that 
multinational firms behave in a manner consistent with concepts from 
the behavioral theory of the firm. The lack of a rich statistical data base 
and causal model of risk creates special burdens on the investment 
planner. Actions are justified and regret is avoided through the use of 
experts and personal contacts. Threshold models and acceptable levels 
of performance are also used as a guide to selecting projects. Finally 
there is Little effort made to deal with the portfolio of risks--rather each 
project is evaluated on its own merits without comparisons made between 
other potential investments. 
PERTAMINA'S DECISION PROBLEM 
Let us now return to the speciiic uncertainty facing Pertamina: 
determining the probability that the United States will actually site an 
LNG receiving terminal in California. There are great difficulties in pro- 
vichg an estimate of this probability because of the complex nature of 
the decision making process in the U.S. with respect to the siting of 
large-scale technologies such as nuclear power plants or LNG terminals. 
The Sting Process in the  US 
For one thing, the decision affects many different individuals and 
groups in society rather than being coniined to the normal relationship of 
a private market transaction such as when a consumer purchases food or 
an appliance from a store or firm. In the siting decision, each of these 
groups has its own objectives, attributes, data base and constraints (Kun- 
reuther, Linnerooth, e t  a1. 1982). 
In the case of the LNG terminal in California there were several dif- 
ferent parties who were concerned with the siting decision: first, the 
applicant for the terminal (Western LNG Terminal ~ssociates)." Second. 
government agencies at the federal state and local level: the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determines whether a proposed 
LNG project is in the public interest and should be allowed, the California 
Coastal Commission has the responsibility of protecting the California 
coastline, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) is the 
'Ibis was a special company set up to represent the LNG sitmg interests of the three gas 
distribution utilities: Southern C&ornia Gas Company, Pacific Gas and Electric and El Paso 
Natural Gas Company. 
principal state body involved in power plant issues, and the State Legisla- 
ture sets up the rules of the siting process. Finally there are public 
interest groups, such as the Sierra Club, and local citizens groups. Each 
of these different parties interacted with each other at &fierent stages of 
the decision process with respect to the siting of a terminal. Their con- 
cerns centered around three different classes of attributes: economic 
aspects, environmental aspects and risk aspects. 
A second feature of the siting problem is the absence of a statistical 
data base on which to base reliable estimates of the different economic, 
environmental and safety risks associated with a proposed project. 
Experts are Likely to differ on their estimates of the consequences of an 
LNG terminal and each of the different parties will use those quantitative 
trgures which best suit their purposes (Lathrop and Linnerooth 1982). 
A s  a result of conflicts between the parties involved in the LNG siting 
debate, today (eight years after initial applications were filed for three 
terminals in California), no final decision has been made as to whether 
one will actually be built. The Los Angeles facility was ruled out because 
of seismic risk and Oxnard was rejected because the risk to the popula- 
tion of a catastrophic accident was perceived to be too high. Only Point 
Conception stdl remains a possibility. In 1978 this site was approved, con- 
ditional on it being a seismically safe harbor. The final report on the 
A detailed description of the Caliiornia siting decision appears in Kunreuther and Lathrop 
(1882) and Linnerooth (1980). A descriptive model of choice indicating the nature of the pol- 
itical and social risks and how they play a role in siting decisions can be found in Kunreuther, 
Linnerooth, et al. (1982). 
safety of the facility has not yet been issued by the FERC and CPUC.'' 
Pertamina 's Investment SCrategy 
Despite these uncertainties with respect to the resolution of political 
and social forces affecting the siting decision in California, Pertamina 
decided to invest in a liquefaction and loading facihty. In taking this 
action Pertamina protected its investment in two ways. First, they nego- 
tiated and signed a contract with Japan in 1973 to ship LNG from its new 
facility. By diversifying their portfolio, Pertamina was not locked into one 
potential customer. They actually began shipping LNG to Japan in August 
1977 from their new plant (Wood, 1979). Second, given their concern 
with increasing demand for LNG by Japan, Pertarnina has renegotiated 
their contract on a month to month basis with PacIndonesia (the US firm) 
since October 1977. Pertamina has the right to cancel at  any time 
without any attached penalty. With the recent expansion of the Japanese 
market for LNG there is now no guarantee that the United States will 
receive liquefied gas from Indonesia even if a terminal in California is 
eventually approve d. 
The other uncertainty that Pertamina faced with respect to the pro- 
fitability of their LNG facility is the future of world energy prices. They 
resolved this problem through contract negotiations. Soon after the ini- 
tial contract between PacIndonesia and Pertamina was signed in 1973 the 
world price of oil rose sharply. Since this contract was not tied to an 
increase in energy prices, the Indonesian government refused to approve 
it. A final version was eventually approved in 1978. It includes an escala- 
tion clause reflecting changes in the Indonesian crude oil export prices. 12 
%her information on this is contained in Office of Technology Assessment (1980). 
In the case of Japan, the initial contract was tied to  the price of world oil 
and automatically reflected the increase so it  did not have to  be renego- 
tiated (Western LNG Terminal Associates 19?8).13 
IV. HOW INSURERS DEAL WITH INTERNATIONAL RISK 
In this section we will investigate the role played by private and 
government insurers against political risk. Our object is to provide some 
perspective on current institutional arrangements and decision processes 
before discussing proposals for change. 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 
If a multinational firm could entice private insurance firms to pro- 
tect  its foreign investments against political and economic risk then the 
responsibility for a loss would be effectively shifted to another party. As 
pointed out above there has been a reluctance on the  par t  of private 
insurance firms to offer coverage because of the  absence of accurate 
data on which to base actuarially fair rates. In fact, political risk is a t  the  
opposite end of the spectrum from the risk of dying where there are 
highly sophisticated mortality tables upon which life insurance premiums 
are based. An ad&tional problem facing private firms is that there are 
large amounts of money a t  stake. Insurance contracts for political risks 
can involve coverage and premiums in the millions of dollars.14 Should 
'%ernan (this volume) provides insights into the usefulness of long-term contracts when 
there are economic risks. 
the company be expropriated by the host country then the resulting loss 
to the insurarice firm could represent a sizeable proportion of its assets 
unless it can engage in reinsurance contracts. 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
The only private firms who are now marketing insurance coverage 
are large companies, such as the Insurance Company of North America, 
or consortiums such as the American International Group or the Chubb 
Group of Insurance Companies (Cathey 1981). We hypothesize that the 
reason for this type of concentration is because of the different degrees 
of risk aversion between large and small firms. Figure 8 illustrates this 
point with a simple diagram relating the premium charged to the amount 
of coverage offered. For small amounts of coverage (until $A) both large 
and small firms are assumed to be risk neutral as indicated by the 
straight line. For amounts in excess of $A the small firms become more 
risk averse relative to the larger companies or consortiums. If $B of pro- 
tection were demanded by a multinational firm then the large company 
would want to charge a premium of $x while the small firm would require 
a larger premium of $y in order to be willing to undertake this insurance. 
After market adjustment, only the large firms would provide insurance 
for risks of type B to multinational investors and these large insurers will 
make monopoly profits, because there are only a limited nurnber of sup- 
pliers of coverage. If both insurance firms and multinational corpora- 
"F'ersonal conversation with Hugh Sinclair, President of lnsurance Company of North Ameri- 
ca Multinational Insurance Corporation (INAMIC). See also Business  Week (1081). 
Total 
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Figure 6. Premiums as a Function of Amount of Insurance for 
Small and Large Insurers. 
tions overestimate the probability of a potential loss, the prices for a 
given amount of coverage will be even &her, thus increasing monopoly 
profits. 
What impact will t h s  type of equilibrium have on changes on the sup- 
ply side? We anticipate that as more insurance firms become knowledge- 
able about political risk, they will enter the market and compete away 
monopoly profits through lower premiums. This is consistent with the 
recent article in B k n e s s  Week (1981) predicting that current high levels 
of profits in the political risk area would soon be eroded by the entry of 
new private insurance companies into the market. 
Multinational firms also rely heavily on OPIC for insurance coverage 
against political risks in developing countries. Since this governmental 
program was established in 1969 it has come under close scrutiny by 
Congressional committees. One of the most controversial issues associ- 
ated with OPIC is whether it is likely to involve the United States in the 
foreign affairs of other countries than would otherwise be the case. 
In the Senate Foreign Relations Hearings of 1974, the US Ambassador 
to Jamaica testified that additional guarantees by OPIC related to $500 
million of investments in Jamaican alurnina/bauxite facilities would have 
been interpreted by the Jamaican government as an indication of lack of 
confidence by the US Government in the Jamaican economy and political 
leadership. Hence, he refused to concur in OPICs proposal (Griffin 1976). 
Based on this testimony and other evidence presented at the hearings, 
the Senate committee concluded that some involvement in host country 
politics was inherent in the nature of the OPIC program. On the other 
hand, the House subcommittee disagreed with these criticisms. It 
claimed "that OPIC provides an institutional framework which can help 
insure that US private corporate activities in the LDCs do not unneces- 
sarily precipitate conflicts directly involving the US government" (Griffin 
p.639). 
In the fall of 1981 Congress extended the life of OPIC for four more 
years. The only major change in OPIC's new charter is to slightly broaden 
the scope of countries where they are allowed to write political risk 
insurance. Previously, their mandate restricted them, except in unusual 
circumstances or when dealing with mineral and energy projects, to coun- 
tries with per capita of less than $1000 (in 1975 dollars). Their new char- 
ter has increased this to $2950 (in 1979 dollars).I5 
DECISION PROCESS 
Both private firms and OPIC face potential problems of adverse selec- 
tion and moral hazard in issuing insurance to multinational firms. 
Adverse Selection 
To illustrate adverse selection consider the simplified case where 
there are an equal number of each of two types of projects, low and high 
risk, but the insurer cannot distinguish between them. Low risk projects 
have a probability Qt of a loss of X dollars whle high risk projects face a 
probability @H > Q L  of a loss of ~ d o 1 l a r s . l ~  The insurer assumes that the 
probability of a loss is the average of the above two probabilities 
Q = (aL + @H)/2.  He bases his premium P per dollar coverage on this 
estimate. 
15~rivate conversation wi th  Robert L. Jordan of OPIC. 
'%e are assuming that there are only two states of nature: loss of X dollars or no loss. 
Figure 7 depicts the phenomenon of adverse selection due to this 
imperfect information by the insurer. Investment planners are assumed 
to be 
Premium 
(Probability) 
Coverage 
Figure 7. The Adverse Selection Problem. 
risk averse, estimate the probability of a loss correctly, and choose an 
amount of insurance which maximizes some objective function (e.g., 
expected utility). The demand curves for lugh and low risk projects are 
then given by DH and DL respectively with full coverage purchased if 
P S @i , i = L.H.17  QL units of coverage will be purchased for low risks 
I7Ftisk averse customers will always demand full protection if the premium per data covep 
age is below the probability of a loss and they do not have a budget constraint. 
projects and QH units for high risk investments. The expected loss to the 
insurer on high risk projects (shown by the hatched area in Figure 7 )  
exceeds the expected gain from low risk ones (the dotted region). 
One way for the insurer to counteract the adverse selection problem, 
when he does not have good information on the respective risks, is to 
market price-quantity policies. Under this system, the insurer attaches a 
premium Pi to a specified amount of coverage Qi. Let < Pi Qi > i = L,H 
represent the price-quantity policies offered as protection against low 
and high risk projects respectively. As one would expect, the premium 
and amount of coverage are both less for low risk projects than high risk 
ones. The analytic properties of this system have been investigated by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). For such a set of policies to function effec- 
tively there must be some monitoring system instituted by insurance 
firms to ensure that no one attempts to protect itself against a large loss 
by purchasing multiple low premium-low coverage policies from several 
different insurers. 18 
M w r d  Hazard 
The moral hazard problem is illustrated in Figure 8 for a set of low 
risk projects. The multinational firm and the insurer both assume at the 
time the investment is made that there is a probability aL that it will fail. 
Based on the demand curve DL, the investment planners purchase QL 
units of insurance at P dollars per unit. Once coverage is bought, the 
IB Kleindorfer and Kunreuther (1982) have investigated the robustness of these types of 
price-quantity policies for the case where potential insured individuals misperceive the prc- 
babilities of a loss. 
Premium 
(Probability) 
Figure 8. The Moral Hazard Problem 
I 
investor is less vigilant than anticipated (and than he would have been in 
! Coverage 
the absence of coverage) so that the actual probability of a project failure 
QL X 
increases to AS a result the insurer faces an expected loss for each 
project shown by the cross hatched area in Figure 8 instead of an 
expected gain indicated by the dotted rectangle. 
The possibility of moral hazard as a result of a firm purchasing 
insurance from OPIC was suggested by the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee following its 1974 hearings. I t  felt that insurance purchased from 
a US government sponsored program like OPIC 
may lull the companies into a false sense of security and induce 
them not to make the necessary adjustments to changing local 
conditions when a healthy relationship between host country 
and companies would require it. 
Moreover, it is the belief of the Committee that government 
insurance may at times increase the likelihood of expropriation. 
Expropriation is viewed by some radical governments as a 
means of striking a blow at the United States Government (Grif- 
fin 1876, p.638). 
v. PIZESCRlPTLYE ANALYSIS 
The above descriptive analysis and case study make clear that there 
are several impediments to a feasible or workable sharing of political 
risks between multinational firms involved in direct foreign investments 
and insurers. Concerning firms, the complexities involved in assessing 
such risks give rise to organizational reactions characterized by single 
projec t-single country myopia, by organizational diffusion of responsibil- 
ity and regret, and by uncertainty avoidance. Such organizational 
behavior can result in various inefficiencies, including improperly diversi- 
fied investments, problems of organizational monitoring and control, and 
inappropriate protective reaction to unfoldmg events. 
These reactions a t  the firm level only compound the normal prob- 
lems that insurers face in providing coverage against large risks. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the role of insuring political risks has been 
assumed for the most part by government agencies such as O P I C . ' ~  One 
may argue, of course, that some governmental involvement in insuring 
these risks is desirable given their strategic ramifications. Nonetheless, 
' O ~ ~ s  Weak (1081) estimated that multinationals worldwide paid some $60&700 million 
in political risk premiums in 1080, with about $500 million going t o  government agencies. 
private industry has demonstrated significant efficiency advantages over 
governmental operations in other areas." so reliance on private market 
mechanisms has prima facie desirable characteristics. 
Our discussion of prescriptive analysis is divided into two parts. We 
first focus on ways that  corporations might improve their assessment 
procedures, so that  they have a better understanding of the hazards for 
which they seek insurance. We then conclude the paper by proposing a n  
alternative insurance program with which private industry can play a 
more prominent role in providing coverage against international hazards. 
IMPROVING RISK ASSESSMENTS BY INVESTORS 
The descriptive analysis above suggests several areas where political 
risk assessment might be improved. We briefly review here recent 
research of interest under two headings: process improvements and 
organizational design. 
Process Improvements 
It should be  recognized that the problem of political risk assessment 
is a special case of the general problem of risk assessment. In recent 
times, the  increasing techmcal and social complexity of industrial society 
has given rise to a concerted research effort to develop publicly and 
scientifically defensible methods for assessing social and technological 
'Osee Blankart (1980) for a survey of comparative results on public versus private provision 
of goods and services. These empirical results strongly support the view that private indus 
try has cost advantages relative to governmental provision af goods. 
hazards. It would take us too far a field to review this literature here but 
some of its major conclusions deserve stress in the present context. 21 
First, one may broadly describe the process of risk assessment as 
containing two interrelated tasks: 
(1) Determirung the structure of the contingent events and deci- 
sions relating to the risk in question. Figure 4 is a very simple 
example of such a structure. This representation in so-called 
"decision-tree" fashion depicts the possible events and conse- 
quences resulting from different scenarios. 
(2) Estimating the probabilities and consequences of each scenario. 
Concerning the second task, recent research has provided a variety 
of subjective and analytical methods of assessment. However, the more 
fundamental problem in the political risk assessment area is the first 
task, determining the "right" decision tree (i.e., a decision tree whose 
causal Links to the risks in question are not just specious). The above 
Indonesian case study indicates how difficult this task is, as it calls for an 
intricate knowledge of the events or scenarios in another country that 
may condition or cause significant political change. Although it would be 
foolish to expect a perfect understanding in advance of such scenarios, 
recent research on corporate planning and risk assessment has shown 
that the use of new corporate planning methodologies can be of help 
here.22 By a formal analysis of alternative assumptions and their conse- 
Z 1 ~ c m t  research on the role of risk assessment in an institutional context can be found ki 
nrad (1 980). 4 ee Ackofi (1974) and Kleindorfer (1982) for a review of recent research on planning 
methods and risk assessment. Zeleny (1979) and Hogarth and Madriakis (1981) discuss re- 
cent field and experimental results on group processes and forecasting. 
quences, these methods enlarge the set of scenarios considered and lend 
added plausibility and understandmg to the chains of events which may 
produce negative outcomes. In the end, of course, nothing substitutes for 
wisdom and intuition of the participants in such planning processes. 
Nonetheless, this research suggests that although political risk assess- 
ment is intrinsically subjective, one can substantially improve even wise 
intuition by instituting explicit and formal procedures. 
One of the most promising assessment procedures for evaluating the 
political risks is SPAIR, an acronym for Subjective Probabilities Assigned 
to Investment Risks. This approach, developed at Shell Oil Company (see 
Meisner 1978 and Gebelein, e t  al. 1978) requires experts to evaluate dif- 
ferent global scenarios (some of which they may generate themselves). 
Each expert provides qualitative judgement on the likelihood that certain 
events such as civil disorder, war ,  expropriation, price controls, taxation 
changes and export or production restrictions will occur. 
These assessments are then converted into probability estimates on 
the basis of how strongly a particular proposition is supported or refuted 
by the expert. The elicitation technique is similar to the Delphi pro- 
cedure because it uses opinion solicited through a questionnaire. Unlike 
the Delphl method the SPAlR procedure does not force a panel consensus. 
The approach also incorporates a Bayesian updating procedure if 
new inlormation becomes available. For example, suppose that Pertam- 
ina brought in a group of experts to estimate the probability that Califor- 
nia would site an LNG terminal. One individual might have estimated the 
probability that a terminal would not be sited as = .05. After learning 
that two of the three proposed sites were rejected, he might revise his 
estimate downwards using data on previous real world scenarios as a 
basis for updating of the p r~bab i l i t y . ' ~  
Organizational Design I s m s  
Many of the problems of country and project myopia observed in 
multinational corporations are  due to the necessity of organizing cor- 
porate activities around specific (large) projects and geographic regions. 
Oftentimes such specialization represents the appropriate tradeoff 
between responsibility and control in  disaggregating corporate world-wide 
activities into manageable chunks. Moreover, political risks form only 
one piece of the  more complicated puzzle of business and foreign 
exchange risks for a given geographic region or group of investment pro- 
jects. 
These considerations can be evaluated operationally by considering 
the costs and benefits of alternative organizational designs, e.g., organiz- 
ing by region, by project, or by functional area. Each of these organiza- 
tional forms has certain corporation-specific benefits for the planning 
and control of activities. The final choice of organizational structure is 
then dictated by those dimensions of corporate performance which are  
most critical for responsibility and control. 
Kelley's (1981) analysis of the organizational structure of interna- 
tional operations reveals considerable diversity in the ways in which firms 
organize, including structuring corporate activities by geographic divi- 
sions (19%), by global product divisions (34%), having international 
=A more detailed discussion on how Bayesian techniques can be used to revise political risk 
estimates appears in Hopple and Kuhlman (1881). 
operations organized under an international division (2229, or by matrix 
organizations (23%). This variety reflects the absence of general truths 
regarding efficient organizational design. For example, organizing by 
product groups may make sense from an operational viewpoint, whereas 
assessing and monitoring political and foreign exchange risks would be 
much simpler under a regional organization. Combining these two criteria 
can be accomplished, through additional managerial resources, by form- 
ing a matrix organization with primary operational control vested in the 
product group while simultaneously giving a regional coordinator the 
authority to  collect and monitor information on all corporate activities in 
a given region. 
Compromise solutions such as matrix organizations have begun to 
prove their worth in coping with a variety of informational and control 
tradeoffs in organizational design.24 Indeed, one may view organizational 
design generally as the evaluation of how different organizational forms 
fare with respect to competing long- and short-run planning and control 
dimensions. Here, just as with decision process problems, the key to 
improvement is an explicit analysis of alternatives and their conse- 
quences. 
In r e v i e w  the above discussion on prescriptive measures for the 
firm, the fundamental problem of dealing with the risks of international 
hazards appears to be the cost and/or unavailability of accurate informa- 
tion concerning probabilities and consequences of different events, and 
the organizational responses that such uncertainty evokes. In part, these 
2 4 ~ e e  Galbraith (1873) for a detailed discussion of matrix organizations and their relation- 
ship to other organizational design issues. 
problems are a generic feature of the complexity of doing business in the 
international arena. However, these informational issues do suggest 
benefits from sharing data across insurers. In the next section, we con- 
sider such an "information partnership" in more detail, as we investigate 
appropriate informational and insurance roles for government and 
private insurers in the political risk area. 
ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
The above discussion points out that there are currently only a few 
large private insurers willing to enter the political risk area in the US 
market. Outside of the United States, the situation is even more skewed, 
with political risk insurance almost entirely in the hands of governmental 
agencies. Considering only the US market, we have hypothesized that 
smaller insurers are unwilling to enter this market because of the large 
uncertainties involved and because their small asset base would not allow 
them to provide coverage against the catastrophic loss potential of many 
political risks. To encourage more private firms to enter the political risk 
market, thus promoting competition and innovation, the following steps 
could be pursued: 
1. Facilitate the pooling and sharing of information between the 
federal government and private industry. 
2. Expand the current OPIC-backed political risk reinsurance pro- 
gram. 
The first of the above measures is designed to increase the quality 
and ease of obtaining information concerning country risks. The second 
measure is designed to decrease maximum exposure of firms in given 
areas through excess-loss reinsurance. Taken together, these measures 
could increase the quality of risk assessment procedures by insurers and 
promote competition. 
Pooling a n d  Shar ing  of I n f o r m a t i o n  
Concerning the pooling of information, governmental agencies now 
serve as the major source of information for political risk assessment for 
private insurers. However, such information is located in many different 
agencies. Our proposal, simply, is to further facilitate the exchange of 
information on risks and claims by setting up a coordinating agency, pos- 
sibly through O P I C . ~ ~  
In setting up or expanding any agency to deal with information pool- 
ing, it would be very important to have private industry's involvement in 
determining what data, both in form and content, would be useful. 
Currently, some private insurers are using a project-region-maximum 
coverage grid to classify risks (and claims history). One would hope that 
a classification scheme of this sort would be devised in cooperation with 
private insurers and the government. The pooling arrangements should 
be sufficiently attractive to motivate private insurers to provide their 
company data on claims settlements for inclusion into the statistical data 
base. All private member insurance firms in such an idormation sharing 
2%est (lQ80) argues that OPIC already has considerable informational advantages and is 
better informed than its typical multinational investor client. 
consortium would then have access to this data base and related backup 
material and could learn from the experience of others in making future 
underwriting decisions. 
In addition to the historical data base described above, one would 
also expect certain future-oriented studies (e.g., information on relevant 
country risk factors and expert prognoses) to be archived in the coordi- 
nating agency. Much of this material is now available only in an ad hoc 
fashion through the respective country desks in the Departments of State 
and Commerce. In the end, of course, political risk assessment is a 
highly uncertain enterprise, even after all possible sources have been 
examined. The point we are making here is that US suppliers of political 
risk insurance, both private and government, should realize the immense 
importance of sharing relevant information on risk assessment. 
Government Reinsurance 
Another reason that private industry has been reluctant to insure 
large foreign investments against political risk is the possibility of their 
incurring severe losses which may threaten their solvency. Private rein- 
surance companies have also been reluctant to share this risk. Govern- 
ment reinsurance may therefore be desirable. By agreeing to share the 
risk in this way, the government also has an implied responsibility to pro- 
tect US investments. m s  involvement will most likely be taken into 
account by governments who are considering acts whch might imperil 
foreign investments. 
Currently, OPIC, through the Overseas Investment Reinsurance 
Group (OIRG), does reinsure private insurers writing policies for develop- 
ing countries and for mineral and energy exploration projects. What we 
are suggesting is an expansion of these reinsurance activities to provide 
excess loss insurance, with long time horizons, in the political risk area 
generally. By continuing OPIC's past premium policies (which have pro- 
vided a self-sustaining margin of profit and reserves), such an expanded 
reinsurance program would provide incentives for additional private 
insurers to enter the political risk insurance market. 
A prototype example of the type of reinsurance program we have in 
mind is provided by the Federal Riot Reinsurance Program, currently 
administered by the Federal Insurance Administration under the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This program provides excess- 
loss reinsurance to private insurers against urban disorders of various 
sorts. The government's only role here is to provide protection against 
very large losses. The program has had no major financial nor adminis- 
trative problems since its inception in the late '60s. Indeed, the Riot 
Reinsurance Program may be phased out during the current Administra- 
tion on the grounds that private reinsurance markets have now grown to 
the point where thls program is superfluous. This changing institutional 
structure suggests the importance of federally backed riot (and crime) 
reinsurance in stimulating the growth of private (re-) insurance. In the 
same spirit, the proposed expansion of current OPIC activities to broader 
reinsurance coverage for political risk may be viewed as encouraging the 
further development of private insurance firms involvement in this area. 
Moreover, one may expect that the strategic and informational 
advantages of OPIC would ensure a continuing important role for this 
agency in the reinsurance market for political risk coverage offered by 
private US firms. 
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